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The purpose of this article is to clarify and defend certain ideas
about rights and responsibilities that I set forth in an earlier article
entitled "Legalism and Medical Ethics." (Hereafter referred to as
LME.)1 I shall be specifically concerned with answering criticisms of
the distinction between rights and responsibilities that have been
brought against it in two recently published articles. 2
In LME, I compared and contrasted two different conceptual
models for dealing with problems in medical ethics in general and
more specifically with problems concerning the relationship between
physicians and their patients. I called them "the model of rights" and
"the model of responsibilities." In commenting on what I called
"legalism," represented by the model of rights, I observed that the
ethical vocabulary employed in the current literature in medical ethics
is almost entirely restricted to the language of rights. I argued in rather
specific terms that this choice of a narrow, specialized vocabulary has
the effect of limiting our understanding of some of the basic issues of
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medical ethics and diverts our attention from other important issues
that are not directly related to questions of rights. In general, my
position is that the vocabulary of ethics is a very rich one indeed.
There are many different ways of conceptualizing moral relationships
and a multiplicity of useful conceptual models for dealing with moral
problems and issues besides the language of rights. In this vein, I did
not intend to suggest that the language of rights be abandoned
altogether; rather my underlying position was anti-reductionist. I was
simply pleading for greater conceptual flexibility and less slavish
adherence to a narrow and restricted ethical vocabulary. To use
"rights" as an all-purpose conceptual tool in medical ethics is a bit like
using a meat cleaver for every cutting purpose - for sewing as well as
for brain surgery. Ronald Dworkin likens rights to trumps; but I
should add, it is not always good or necessary to play trumps. 3
The two critical articles with which I am concerned here are reductionist in effect, if not in intent, for they imply that in dealing with
problems in medical ethics, one has to choose between the concept of
rights and the concept of responsibilities. However, interestingly
enough, the authors of the two articles approach the issues quite
differently and reach exactly opposite conclusions. In the first article,
Sara Ann Ketchum and Christine Pierce opt for the language of rights
against the language of responsibilities. In the second article, on the
other hand, Clifton Perry contends that the distinction between rights
and responsibilities is a "distinction without a difference" and that the
difference between the two concepts is therefore simply a difference
in "defeasibility" (i.e., stringency) and not a qualitative one at all. As
a result, he discards the ethics of rights (in my sense) in favor of an
ethics of responsibilities. Accordingly, insofar as both articles are
conceptually reductionistic, either in favor of reducing the language of
medical ethics to the language of rights or of reducing it to the language of responsibilities, it is easy to see how they could not fail to
come to conclusions that are inconsistent with mine, which
presuppose an anti-reductionist approach.
The Ambiguities of "Rights"
Although I did not emphasize the point as strongly as I should have
in LME, one of the chief difficulties in most present-day medical
ethics discussions which refer to rights is that they hardly ever explain
which particular meaning of the term " rights" is involved, for
example, in expressions like "the right to life ," " the right to medical
care," "the right to die," "the right to an abortion," "the right to see
one's medical record, " "the right to have a second opinion," "the
right to refuse treatment," etc. (I assume that we are speaking here of
moral and not purely legal rights .) 5 In my discussion of rights in LME,
in order to avoid being trapped by the ambiguities of the term
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"rights," I tried to specify as carefully as I could what I meant by the
term. The concept of rights that I intended in that article is a widely
accepted and ethically important sense of "rights" that might be
called " choice-rights."6 I shall henceforth refer to this sense of rights
as rights in the strong sense. However, I did not specifically mention
other senses of "rights" that are found in the literature of medical
ethics. Since my failure to mention them may account for various
misunderstandings of my position in LME, it will be worthwhile for
me to discuss briefly some other concepts of rights. In addition to the
concept of rights in the strong sense, there are several concepts of
rights in what might be called extended senses. Under the latter I shall
include the right not to be harmed, need-rights, and what I shall call
"implemental rights." I shall discuss these various concepts of rights
presently, but first I need to say more about rights in the strong sense.

'}

Rights in the strong sense are essentially rights to choose. As such,
they are based on the notion of freedom of choice, which Locke
describes as "a liberty to dispose and order, as he lists, his person, his
actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of
those (natural) laws under which he is; and therein not to be subject
to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own." 7 Freedom
of choice in this sense is often referred to (incorrectly) as moral
autonomy.8 Thus, Ketchum and Pierce say that rights talk focuses on
persons as "autonomous agents" and "in talking about patient's rights
we portray the patient as an autonomous agent" (p. 276). As Benn
points out, it would be more accurate to use the term "autarchy"
rather than "autonomy" in this context, for "autarchy" represents the
model of a "chooser" rather than of a moral ideal suggested by the
term "nomos" (i.e., law).9
A distinctive feature of rights in the strong sense, in contrast to
rights in extended senses, is that it is perfectly intelligible to say of
such rights that a person has a right to do wrong, that is, that he can
exercise his right wrongly; for, after all, he can choose wrongly and his
right gives him the freedom to choose "as he listeth." 10 In contrast,
rights in the extended senses of "rights" that I shall consider presently
entail that no one can have a right to do what is wrong, i.e., one only
has a right to do what is right. The right to do wrong, which only
characterizes rights in the strong sense, includes the right to make
mistakes, the right not to help others in need, and even the right,
under certain circumstances, to hurt others or to hurt oneself.
Inasmuch as the exercise of a right in the strong sense is a function
of the right-holder's will, his choice rights in the strong sense can, as I
observed in LME, be waived. (In the extended senses, rights cannot be
waived.) For the same reason, by virtue of his right, a person's choice
is binding on others without regard to whether or not what is willed
(or chosen) is reasonable. 11 In general, then, if a person has a right in
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the strong sense, his choice is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for it to be binding. In other words, rights in the strong sense
become effective on demand, that is, on being demanded and claimed
by a "will." The essentially discretionary or arbitrary character of
rights in the strong sense that their connection with choice and will
entails is what I intended to convey by calling them "peremptory." 12
Historically and conceptually rights in the strong sense are assimilated to property rights, with which they have many features in
common. For if one has a property right in something, say, Blackacres, then one can do whatever one chooses with it. For, other things
being equal, a person's having a property right in a thing is logically
independent of what he intends or wants to do with that thing. The
distinctive thing about a property right is that it confers on the owner
the freedom to do whatever he chooses to do with his property and
prohibits others from interfering with the exercise of his choice. 1 3
Insofar as a person's body is construed as part of his property, a
person has somewhat the same kind of rights over his body as he has
over his other possessions, i.e., to do what he wants with it and to
exclude interference by others in what he chooses to do with his
body. A direct violation of one's property rights, including the integrity
of one's body, is legally regarded as trespass. 14
The seemingly paradoxical aspects of rights in the strong sense disappear when we realize that rights talk is not really so much about
the rights of the right-holder as it is about the obligations owed by
rights-owers to the right-holder. 15 For rights consist both legally and
ethically in a relationship between a right-holder and right-owers and
the rights of the one are reflected in correlative obligations of
others.16 The shift in focus from right-holder to right-ower is portrayed very graphically by Hart when he writes of the bonds between
right-holder and right-ower that "the precise figure is not that of two
persons bound by a chain, but of one person bound, the other end of
the chain lying in the hands of another to use if he chooses ."17The
latter, of course, may choose foolishly, mistakenly or wrongly; yet the
rights-ower has an obligation to do or refrain from doing what the
right-holder chooses. It is apparently this aspect of rights that
Ketchum and Pierce are thinking of when they speak of a person's
right to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds or "even for
reasons of vanity" (p. 277).
As Hart and others have pointed out, inasmuch as the concept of a
right in the strong sense has its basis in the right-holder's "autonomous" (= autarchic) will, i.e., his ability to choose, it can be attributed
only to "adult human beings capable of choice." Thus, animals and
babies, perhaps even children, cannot have that kind of right, simply
because they do not have the requisite capacity to choose. A fortiori,
the notion of a fetus having a right or of having a right against a dead
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person would be logically absurd if "rights" is used in the strong sense.
Hence, Perry's examples, just mentioned, are beside the point, for the
rights I was concerned with in LME were rights in the strong sense. On
the other hand, Ketchum and Pierce, who are quite clearly using the
notion of rights in the strong sense, can consistently attribute the
rights of which they speak only to adult human beings who have
complete control over their faculties, i.e., are "autonomous"
(= autarchic).
Extended Senses of "Rights"

.

w

Let us now turn to some extended senses of "rights." I shall consider only four of them here, because they are the ones encountered
most frequently in writings on medical ethics. 18 As I have already
pointed out, rights ill these extended senses imply that exercising a
right is eo ipso doing somethillg right, i.e., one never has a right (in the
extended sense) to do wrong. Thus, an act of will or choice is neither
necessary nor sufficient to activate a right ill the extended sense and
one cannot waive a right in this sense. Therefore, unlike rights in the
strong sense, rights in the extended sense are not peremptory. 19
The first extended sense of "rights" is a trivial one where having a
right to do something simply means that it is not wrong to do it and,
conversely, havillg no right to do something simply means that it is
wrong to do it. 20 I mention this trivial sense merely in order to warn
agaillst slipping into it in discussions of rights. Rights in this sense have
completely lost the property of being "trumps."
A second and less trivial extended sense of "rights" will be called
the harm sense of right. This is a person's right not to be wrongfully
harmed; if he has this right, then others have the correlative obligation
not to harm him wrongfully. 21 In this sense of rights, the deliberate
infliction of any sort of wrongful harm on a person is taken to be a
violation of his rights . It follows that if rights are understood in this
way, then the whole of the Decalogue could be translated into a Bill
of Rights: the right not to be killed, the right not to have one's
property stolen, etc. However, the identification of every harmful act
of this sort as a violation of rights does not appear to add anything
more to its wrongfulness . Indeed, perhaps it even dimillishes the
wrongfulness; for there seems to be something strange in accepting
this translation of harms into rights language, which implies that one is
saying such things as that a woman has a right not to be raped, that
the Jews in Germany had a right not to be massacred in the gas
chambers, or that people have a right not to be tortured, etc. Instead
of strengthening the moral condemnation of these evils, the use of
rights language to categorize the evils in such cases has the effect of
trivializing them.22 It should be observed in passing that, if there are
harm rights, such rights, unlike rights in the strong sense, can be
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attributed to babies and animals, perhaps to fetuses and possibly even
to physical objects like the environment or the Mona Lisa! It should
be noted that some of Perry's examples seem to be about rights in the
harm sense.
Another closely related extended sense of "rights" gives us what I
call need-rights. Such rights are based on needs and create correlative
obligations in others to fill them. To make sense of the notion of
need-rights, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish needs from wants,
choices, or interests, for otherwise we would be forced to accede to
the proposition that everybody has a right to whatever he wants in the
sense that, other things being equal, others have an obligation to give
him what he wants. Unlike wants, which may be arbitrary and capricious, needs are objective and "rational," in senses that could be
specified. This difference can be seen in the fact that, although a
person may know better than others what he wants, someone else may
be a better judge of what he needs. For example, although a patient
may want to have a finger amputated, a doctor may be a better judge
of whether or not he needs to have it amputated. 23 Furthermore, it
should be pointed out that the concept of a need-right implies that,
regardless of whether or not the patient wants a certain treatment or
even if he refuses it, if he really needs it then he has a right to it in the
need sense of right and it would be wrong for him to refuse because to
do so would violate his own right! (Of course, in the strong sense of
right he would have a right to refuse.)
Still, I submit that even if a need of an especially pressing sort
creates some sort of prima facie claim on others in the sense that,
other things being equal, others ought to try to meet the need, it does
not follow that anything is added by calling needs "rights," except
that in some situations it might be permissible to use coercion to
fulfill a pressing need. The assumption that other people's needs can
create duties only because they are rights exemplifies the impoverishment of ethical language that I have already complained about. Thus,
with regard to Perry's example of the starving man in need of food, I
would contend that we ought to help, not because he has a right or
even as an act of supererogation, but simply because he desperately
needs food and we have it to give. An ethics of responsibility is, in this
case, more humane than an ethics of rights! Again, as with rights in
the harm sense, it should be pointed out that rights in the needs sense
may be attributed to babies, to animals, and to fetuses (at least when
they are fairly well developed).
It is clear from Perry's examples that he has in mind rights in an
extended sense of one sort or another, e.g., either of rights in the
harm or in the needs sense. For, as I have just pointed out, if a fetus
could be said to have rights, these rights could only be rights in one or
other of these senses.
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Indeed, Perry's interesting discussion of the "right to life" shows
quite clearly that this alleged right, when attributed to fetuses, is an
amalgam of a harm-right and a need-right, and not a right in the strong
sense at all. 24 But, inasmuch as my remarks on rights in LME were
concerned only with rights in the strong sense, Perry's comments on
rights are beside the point as far as my article is concerned. My own
position is that harms and needs can stand on their own feet, as it
were, as far as ethics is concerned and it is unnecessary and misleading
to assume that they could have ethical import only if they are labeled
as rights. Assuming that this is the main point of Perry's attack on
rights, I think that I can accept much of what he says about relationships and needs, although, of course, I would have to reject what he
says about rights, because I mean something different from what he
means by "rights."
Finally, there is a fourth extended sense of rights which is especially
important for medical ethics. Rights in this sense might be called
impiementai rights. They are the rights a person has to the necessary
means for carrying out his obligations, duties and roles. Thus, it has
been traditionally held that the state (the Prince) has certain (implemental) rights over its citizens, e.g., to exercise coercion over them in
some form or other, because it needs such rights to carry out its duty
to secure justice, prevent crime and preserve the peace. The rights of
parents over their children might be regarded as implemental rights in
the same sense, for they need them in order to carry out their parental
duties to care for their children, to nourish and educate them, etc.
Sometimes it is alleged that physicians have similar implemental rights
that are necessary to carry out their task of caring for their patients,
e.g., the right to freedom from interference, the right to decide about
treatment, the right to certain kinds of information, and so on. Historically, the derivation of rights from duties, as reflected in the notion
of an implemental right, has provided an important rationale for
rights. For example, according to some philosophers in the Thomist
tradition, the rights of persons follow from the natural law and
acquire their authority from the natural law itself (or from God 's
will), because it is necessary for persons to have these rights in order
to fulfill their duties under the natural law (e .g., to God).25 An interesting argument using the implemental concept of rights is given by
Albert Jonson, who uses this particular concept as a basis for certain
right s of doctors, e.g., their rights to autonomy and to non-interference , on the grounds that they are necessary means for fulfilling their
obligations correlative to the rights of people to health care. 26
Before concluding this general review of different senses of "right,"
I want once more to emphasize how important it is for writers using

the t erm to specify which particular sense of "rights" they have in
mind . Otherwise , in their discussions they will be arguing past each
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other, simply because they are using "rights" in different senses. (I
have pointed out how this is so in Perry's critique of LME.) I also want
to add that there are many other ways of classifying rights, as well as
many other kinds of rights that I have failed to mention. The principium divisionis of the classification adopted here relates to the kind of
moral rationale that is offered for the particular rights being discussed;
it is this aspect of rights, i.e., their grounding, that is most pertinent to
the issues raised by my critics.
Defeasibility and How Rights Become Inoperative
Perry's claim that the distinction between rights and responsibilities
is a distinction without a difference rests to a large extent on his use

of two words, "peremptory" and "defeasible." He argues that rights
are not peremptory but defeasible, and in that regard they are similar
to responsibilities. Consequently, he concludes, the distinction
between rights and responsibilities breaks down and merely reflects a
"difference in defeasibility of obligatory relationships ... rather than
a qualitative difference in such relationships."
It is evident, however, that, in his critique of LME, Perry assigns
"peremptory" an entirely different meaning from the one that I had
in mind in LME. As I used it, it was intended to capture the core
meaning of rights in the strong sense. 27 Perry, on the other hand,
seems to mean by "peremptory" something like "absolute" or
"unconditional." His use of the term "defeasibility" also presents
difficulties for again, he departs from the standard usage of the term
and uses it to mean something like the opposite of absolute or unconditional. 28 Quite apart from the choice of words, Perry brings up
some important questions about the absoluteness and unconditionality of rights that need to be discussed. I find it easiest to treat them
by subsuming them under the general question: how do rights become
inoperative, i.e., of no effect? There are three ways in which this can
happen.
To begin with, a right might become inoperative simply by being
shown not to exist! Thus, under ordinary circumstances, I have no
right to refuse treatment for you: the right in question is non-existent.
I never had it. Sometimes a right may be rendered non-existent
through some act or other that cancels or annuls it; for example, one
person's property right in a thing is extinguished when he sells it to
someone else. Again, a right may be forfeited, i.e., taken away, as
when a criminal forfeits his right to liberty. A person may also lose
some of his rights by becoming incompetent, e.g., he loses his right to
make certain decisions about his medical treatment. Exactly how and
why rights are inoperative in this sense depends obviously on what
kinds of rights, what senses of "rights," we are concerned with.
Another and quite different way in which a right can become
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inoperative is by being waived by the right-owner, either explicitly or
tacitly. In cases involving invasive treatment, patients generally waive
their rights to refuse. It should be noted that one can only waive a
right if one already has it and one does not necessarily give away a
right completely by waiving it. Even when a person waives a right on a
particular occasion, it still remains his right, to use again if he chooses.
Sometimes a person can withdraw a waiver, as when a person changes
his mind about consenting to a certain kind of medical treatment. The
details of where, when and what are the effects of waiving a right are
beyond the scope of this essay. But, as I pointed out earlier, only
rights in the strong sense can be waived.
Finally, a right may become inoperative because it conflicts with
another right, say, of another person. We find a lot of nonsense in
discussions of so-called "conflicts of rights" as when, for example, one
right is said to "override" or "outweigh" another right, making the
latter (following Ross) only a "prima facie" right or (in Perry's sense)
a "defeasible" right. Such talk, however, systematically conflates outweighing and overriding with annulling, that is, the first with the third
way of becoming inoperative.

I

I

There are two ways in which rights might be said to conflict. First,
your right to Blackacres might be said to conflict with my right to
Blackacres; but that means only that our two claims to Blackacres are
incompatible; in that case, one person's having the right to Blackacres
cancels and excludes the other person's right; he has no right. On the
other hand, one person's right might be said to conflict with the right
of another in the sense that it is physically impossible for someone to
fulfill both of them; in that case, neither of the parties thereby loses
his right in the sense that it is cancelled or annulled; what happens is
that one of the rights is simply suspended - put on ice, so to speak.
To say that it is suspended means that if per contra it were (or
becomes) possible to fulfill both rights, both of them should be
fulfilled.
It may be easier to see what is involved in this kind of "conflict of
rights" if we approach the problem from the point of view of the
right-ower rather than from that of the right-holder. If we do so, we can
interpret the conflict just mentioned as essentially a conflict between
different correlative obligations owed by a right-ower. Thus, so-called
"conflicts of rights" would be reducible to conflicts of obligations,
i.e., moral dilemmas. 29 An example may help to clarify this analysis.
Consider the case of a pregnant woman who refuses treatment,
thereby endangering the life of a baby she is about to bear; there are a
number of rights that might be involved here, not only the mother's
right, but also the father's right, society's right, the baby's right, etc.
The health care provider (and the state) is faced with opposite and
incompatible obligations, one to respect the mother's right to refuse
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and the other to preserve the baby's life. It is, for physical reasons,
impossible to do both and so the right-ower has to choose which to do
and which not to do. But in choosing for the baby, he is not denying
the mother's right in the sense that he denies that she has the right;
rather, he is simply admitting that he cannot fulfill both of his
correlative obligations: impossibilium nulla obligatio est. 30 That in
such cases the right is not extinguished (annulled) but only'suspended
may be seen in other cases of inability to perform where the rightower is required to provide some sort of compensation, if possible, as
when a piece of property is seized by eminent domain. The distinction
I am making should be clear if we consider the case of a person who is
unable to pay two debts because he does not have enough money. The
debt that is not paid is not eo ipso cancelled and the creditor's right
extinguished; rather, it is simply suspended (as in a moratorium).
In general, then, it seems preferable to hold to the position that
rights, if they are valid, cannot be overridden, that is, rendered of no
effect, except in the indirect sense that the right-owers, the other
parties in the rights relationship who have the correlative obligations,
are unable to honor them all under the circumstances. In this way, the
absoluteness of rights, if you wish, their "peremptoriness," can be
saved while room is made for the kind of flexibility demanded by the
real world of contingent impossibilities; at the same time, the distinction can be preserved between extinguishing and suspending a right
along the lines that I have suggested.
It follows from this analysis that rights in the strong sense are, in
important respects, qualitatively different from need-rights and harn:rights, and from what were called "responsibilities" in LME. Rights in
the strong sense are absolute - black and white; they cannot be
weighed against each other - my liberty is not to be measured against
yours. These rights are not "defeasible" in Parry's sense of the word,
that is, outweighable; they can only be rendered inoperative in the
three ways indicated, namely, by being extinguished (annulled, forfeited), waived or suspended. On the other hand, harms and needs and
the associated rights and responsibilities are not rendered inoperative
in the three ways mentioned but, unlike rights in the strong sense,
they can be compared and weighed against each other; and so can the
corresponding responsibilities. One harm or one need may outweigh
another morally and the corresponding responsibility with respect to
the weightier claim may be more stringent than another responsibility
with respect to another less weightier claim, that is, it would be
morally preferable to pursue one rather than the other. If my contentions about these differences are accepted, then Perry's claim that the
difference between rights and responsibilities is a distinction without a
difference along with his attempted assimilation of rights to responsibilities must be rejected.
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Equality
From the critical comments made in the two articles on the question of equality, it is clear that my brief remarks in LME on this
subject have been misunderstood. Thus, Ketchum and Pierce complain
that my arguments overlook "the fact of inequality of power between
the parties" (i.e., physician and patient), which it is the purpose of the
rights model to rectify. They conclude that in downgrading the model
of rights, I am conferring "unquestioned moral authority" on the
physician. Since this outcome is exactly the opposite of what I
intended in LME, which was to defend a non-authoritarian conception
of the physician-patient relationship, I obviously need to explain more
clearly what I had in mind about equality.

'I

(
I

/'

Perry also seems to have had some difficulty in understanding my
remark that the rights model, like a contractual model, presupposes an
"antecedent equality." It is clear that there are a number of different
senses of "equality," which need to be kept separate. There is, of
course, one sense in which a person enters a contractual relationship in
order to overcome an inequality, a disparity, e.g., my not having what
you want and your not having what I want. What I had in mind in
using the term "antecedent equality" for a rights-relationship, was
simply that the model of rights in the strong sense presupposes that all
the parties involved are "adult human beings capable of choice," who
on that account have an equal right to be free. H Now sometimes, of
course, patients have this equal capacity to exercise choice when they
first meet with their physicians and in such cases they would be antecedently equal in the sense intended. However, many physicianpatient relationships are initiated under circumstances where the
patient is not a free and equal agent at all. He may be entirely
incapable of making a choice, e.g., he may be in a coma or helpless in
some way or other; and if the initial encounter is an emergency, he will
have no opportunity to shop around or to bargain with his physician.
In such situations, patients begin their relationship to physicians as
unequals, and the physician has a lot of power to determine what
happens. But as a patient recovers, he gradually regains equal status
with the physician and can relate to him as a free and equal agent.
What I want to emphasize is that, even though the relationship starts
as an unequal one, subsequently every effort should be made by all of
the parties, especially physician and patient, to equalize the relationship as much and as quickly as possible. Indeed, restoring equality, or
bringing it about might be included as one of the aims of medical
treatment. 32
In their critique of LME, Ketchum and Pierce begin by attacking
my suggestion that the physician-patient relationship be regarded as a
kind of friendship. In citing Aristotle on friendship to illustrate what I
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meant, I did not think that my readers would assume that I was
thereby committed to everything that Aristotle says about friendship,
including what he says about the inequality of men, women and
slaves.33 My position would be that what is basically wrong with
Aristotle's account is not what he says about friendship but what he
says about equality and inequality, superiority and inferiority, virtue
and merit, and the kind of authoritarianism that he bases on them. 34 I
could as well have cited Kant, whose grossly disregarded discussion of
friendship is somewhat like Aristotle's except that it emphasizes
equality. 3 5 Perhaps what is most important is their contention that
everyone needs friends.
The position taken by Ketchum and Pierce seems to be a very
strong one, namely, that the physician-patient relationship never can
be and never ought to be a personal relationship such as exists
between friends (philia), e.g., one in which the physician may be
expected to feel concern for the patient and to regard him, as
Aristotle says, as an alter ego. 36 Their attack on the interpersonal,
friendship model has two sides. First, they maintain that it is inconsistent with the institutional character of the physician-patient relationship. And second, they maintain that it overlooks "the fact of
inequality of power between the parties, and the effect of this
inequality on the nature of their friendship" (p. 276).
The general argument that Ketchum and Pierce bring against the
ethics of responsibility may be summarized as follows: the physicianpatient relationship is an institutional relationship, therefore it is a
power relationship and as a power relationship the physician-patient
relationship needs to be analyzed by a medical ethics based on rights
rather than responsibilities. For ease of discussion, I shall break the
argument down into three parts, which I shall refer to as theses,
namely: (1) the institutional thesis; (2) the power thesis; and (3) the
rights thesis. In my comments on these three theses, I shall try to
show that whatever initial plausibility they might have is due to the
ambiguities of the terms "institution," "institutional" and "power."
When these ambiguities are cleared up, the theses and the argument as
a whole will be seen to be a congeries of non sequiturs.
Medicine as an Institution
The first thesis is that "the profession of medicine is an institution
defined by laws, practices and rules .... (And) the physician/patient
relationship qua physician/patient relationship is therefore an institutional relationship" (pp. 273-274).
Before proceeding any further we should note that the term "institution" itself is a weasel word with a multiplicity of meanings. (And
so, of course, is the adjective "institutional. ") As I used the word
"institution" in LME, it referred to "an establishment, organization or
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association" such as a hospital, a medical center or, perhaps even the
AMA. I would suppose that the physician-patient relationship is not
institutional in that sense! The fact that I did not discuss whether or
not the physician-patient relationship is institutional in some other
sense does not mean that I deny that it is institutional in any sense at
all. Since Ketchum and Pierce fail to explain what they mean by
"institution" and "institutional," it will be necessary for us to
examine some other possible senses of these terms.
To begin with, there is the sense of "institution" in which we speak
of property, marriage, slavery, promising, etc., as institutions. We
might call them social institutions. that is, clusters of accepted social
rules, practices and norms defining, for example, roles and rolerelationships.37 In this sense, medicine is probably a universal institution, as is the nuclear family, for there are "doctors" in almost every
society and culture. Institutions in this sense, i.e., social institutions,
are "not created by laws, institutions, and government actions" (p.
273); they existed before and independently of them, although, of
course, they are controlled and regulated by laws, etc. But the use of
the word "create" suggests that we are dealing with a necessary and
sufficient condition of a thing's coming into existence; and governmental action is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of
any of the social institutions of the kind that we are considering.
If by "institution" one means what I have called a "social institution," then I have no difficulty in admitting that medicine is an institution and that the physician-patient relationship is institutional. But
being a social institution does not make the physician-patient relationship non-personal or impersonal any more than the fact that marriage
(courtship, parenthood) as a social institution makes the relationship
between spouses a non-personal or impersonal relationship. Perhaps
just being married or being in a physician-patient relationship is insufficient to guarantee that there is a personal relationship, e.g., one of
concern and caring. On the other hand, being institutional does not
rule it out. Rather, social institutions provide, as it were, the framework for our everyday activities and relationships, telling us in very
general terms what is and what is not to be done, what is and what is
not to be expected, and so on. But they allow considerable leeway as
to how things should be done . We might compare institutional norms
to the rules of chess. You cannot play chess unless you play by the
rules. On the other hand, playing by the rules is not enough to make
someone a good chess player. By the same token, being a good spouse
or a good doctor may require following rules of some sort, but that
does not make a person a good spouse or a good doctor. To be good at
these things requires judgment, experience, sensitivity, devotion, and
responsibility.
But when they say that the physician-patient relationship is institu-
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tional, Ketchum and Pierce seem to have in mind by "institution"
something much stronger than simply a social institution; they say, for
example, that it is "political .. . in the straight-forward conventional
sense of being organized, constituted, and created by laws, institutions
[sic] , and government actions" (p. 273). They go on to say that "an
institution is a way of structuring human relationships," etc. I do not
find the term "structure" very helpful here, because it has a number
of different meanings. In this context, we seem to be dealing with
something that is government-created or that by definition involves
power relationships. If the physician-patient relationship is by definition a power relationship, then we might as well skip to thesis (2),
because the question has been begged: to say that it is institutional
does not add anything to the argument. But let us suppose that in
calling the physician-patient relationship "institutional," Ketchum and
Pierce wish simply to call attention to a strong and ethically significant connection with government. If so, it is worthwhile asking what
that connection is. As I have already pointed out, it is quite absurd to
say that the physician-patient relationship itself, e.g., between individuals, is created by laws in a way that, for example, laws might bring
into existence a new kind of financial institution or a new military
rank.
Now the government connection might be that some of the powers
of physicians or of the medical establishment are "created" by the
government. There is no question that these powers, including economic powers, have been enormously expanded through the growth of
public bureaucracies, for example, by Medicare. But to say this is to
say something entirely different than that the government creates the
relationship and something that is perhaps true. It may be true, for all
I know, that requirement of licensure by the state which, for a long
time did not obtain, has tended to augment the power of physicians in
society, because it has given them a monopoly. The problem of the
social power of physicians is an important one from the point of view
of ethics, but a problem I did not address in LME, which was concerned with quite a different set of problems, namely, problems
regarding relationships between individuals. But questions about the
social power of physicians as a group are different from questions
about the power of individual physicians over individual patients. I
shall return specifically to the question of individual power when I
examine the third thesis. 38
Perhaps the government connection that Ketchum and Pierce have
in mind when they say that the physician-patient relationship is institutional (structured, political) is that government regulates and
controls the practice of medicine, as it regulates and controls many
other activities, such as driving an automobile, getting married, or
running a business. It is obvious that government (or legal) interven-
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tion has a significant influence on th,e character of the operations
regulated. The effect may be to facilitllite the activity, to control the
activity in the public interest, e.g., through licensure, to expand or to
restrict its scope, or even to create a monopoly. But to say that by
virtue of regulating and controlling something, government (or law)
creates that thing, whether it be the physician-patient relationship, a
marriage, or a business is a strange thing to say. After all, a thermostat
controls the furnace, but it does not, on that account, create the heat
provided by the furnace.
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The question of public regUlation and legal control leads to what
are sometimes referred to as the physician's gate-keeper functions,
which Ketchum and Pierce imply are important institutional aspects
of medicine. These functions are, for the most part, created by law
and are designed to serve the purposes of government. It is impossible
to get born or to die -legally speaking,- without a certificate from a
physician! Health certificates are required from physicians for various
purposes. Physicians are authorized to prescribe certain drugs that
laymen cannot buy without a prescription, although there are also
drugs that even physicians are not permitted to prescribe.39 There are
numerous legally defined gatekeeper functions such as these that are
assigned to physicians by society, although what they are in particular
varies from time to time and from place to place. 4o Many of these
functions serve political and social ends that have little to do with
medicine and that are often resented by physicians. Thus, society uses
physicians in the USA to control the distribution of drugs and it uses
physicians in the USSR to control who will be permitted to have a
vacation at a seaside resort. The question that we need to ask is how
crucial these gatekeeper functions are for an ethical understanding of
the doctor-patient relationship. After all, there is nothing unique to
medicine about being gatekeepers. Society assigns gatekeeper functions to many different occupations - to inspectors and examiners of
various sorts, that is, persons without whose permission one is not
allowed to do what one wants to do. Gatekeepers are essential cogs in
the machinery of a bureaucratic society. Furthermore, licensing is also
a bureaucratic control device and does not automatically confer
"political power" on the licensee; does the fact that airline pilots need
to be licensed give them political power? 41
Before turning to the next part of the argument, I need to make
two general comments about the institutional thesis. First, institutions,
in all of the senses mentioned here, can and do change. Physicians tell
me that their relations with patients have changed quite radically in
the last 10 years: patients expect more and are more demanding, while
new sorts of legal and organizational requirements are imposed on
physicians in their day-to-day practice. Thus, it is risky to be dogmatic
about the physician-patient relationship, simply because change is in
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the air. Second, institutions, in all senses, are subject to ethical review,
evaluation and critique; after all, slavery was once an institution in
American society, both a social institution and a legally sanctioned
institution, but that fact does not vindicate it morally . By the same
token, even by granting that the physician-patient relationship is institutional, in somewhat the same sense in which slavery used to be
institutional, it does not follow that that is the way it ought to be
ethically.
In sum, with regard to the institutional thesis, none of the various
considerations relating to institutions that have been mentioned prove
what Ketchum and Pierce are trying to prove, namely, that the
physician-patient relationship cannot be and ought not to be a
personal relationship and that it is essentially a power relationship
that, as such, overrides personal relationships. Thus, unless this thesis
is taken to be true by definition, we need some kind of additional
supporting evidence for it.
Power and the Physician-Patient Relationship
Let us now tum to the second thesis, the power thesis, namely, that
the physician-patient relationship is a power relationship. We must
start with the question: what kind of claims are being made for it? Is
it always true? Usually true? Often true? True for important and
critical cases? True where significant ethical issues are to be found? Is
it true for primary care physicians as well as for tertiary care physicians? Is it true for Russian physicians as well as American physicians?42
At the outset, we must acknowledge the obvious empirical fact that
there often is a power dimension to the physician-patient relationship
as, for example, when a physician unilaterally imposes his will on a
patient by making decisions for him that he does not want to accept
(i.e ., medical paternalism). It is easy to see that the existence and
exercise of this sort of power create ethical problems. The question we
have to ask with regard to it is: what kind of power are we talking
about when we speak of a physician's power and how is it best
ethically to deal with this kind of medical power?
We must first determine what Ketchum and Pierce mean by
"power." From what they say about it, it is clear that they mean
power in some sort of manipulative sense, that is, a kind of power that
one person exercises over another. Power in this sense is epitomized in
the question: who will prevail? 43 It takes for granted a zero-sum situation in which, if one person has power, then other people do not have
any power vis Ii vis him and are, therefore, subject to him as the
person who has the power. Given this concept of power, the crucial
question becomes, in the words of Ketchum and Pierce: who is to be
the "final arbiter"? Needless to say, by insisting on asking this ques-
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tion, they beg the question in favor of a particular and narrow concept
of power.
The particular conception of power and of decision-making that is
implied here is founded on the Hobbesian-Lockean notion that "men
are perpetually in competition for unequal power or wealth, all seeking to invade each other." McPherson calls this notion the "bourgeois
model of man" and the morality founded on it "bourgeois morality"
(= the ethics of natural rights).44 It follows from this a priori model
of human nature, which views men as naturally competitive and contentious, that physicians and their patients will always be in an
inevitable and insuperable competition for power and that whoever
wins, or ought to win, becomes, or ought to become, the "final
arbiter" in any medical situation. It is important to observe that the
model in question does not simply assert that there frequently is in
fact a play for power; no one would deny that. Rather, it posits that
competitiveness is an essential part of human nature and of the human
situation.
It hardly needs to be pointed out that the Hobbesian-Lockean
theory of human nature, even if for present purposes we restrict its
scope to the physician-patient relationship, is not an empirical theory
at all. No a priori theory can prove that collaboration and cooperation
are impossible in principle. The mere fact that there often is some
kind of "manipulation," either by physician or by patient, and that
some sort of unilateral decision-making often takes place, such as, for
example, the irrational refusal of treatment by a patient or the performance of unnecessary surgery on the part of a doctor, does not
prove that this sort of manipulation is necessary or inevitable. The
model in question is simply part of a particular political ideology.
The ethico-political theory of power taken for granted by Ketchum
and Pierce is one that I reject for a number of reaons, but primarily
for ethical reasons. Their assertions to the contrary notwithstanding,
the fact is that human beings can, do, and often must collaborate and
make decisions together. For ethical reasons, they should do so. The
issue between us is due to our differing conceptions of power; I regard
this as an ethical issue. For a number of reasons, I prefer to define
power as the capacity to bring about changes in the world. 45 In this
sense of power, new technology has greatly increased the power of
physicians as nuclear physics has increased the power of generals.
According to the definition that I offer here, although there may be
competition for power, there need not be. Power in my sense can be
shared; power in the sense assumed by Ketchum and Pierce cannot be
shared.
As is well-known, on the political level, the rights theory is not the
only political theory of how to cope with excessive governmental
power. There is an alternative, namely, the democratic theory of participation. By analogy, on the level of individual relationships, as in the
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physician-patient relationship, one way - I think the best way - to
cope with excessive physician power is to have a participatory kind of
decision-making in which all interested parties take part. 46 Under
ideal conditions this kind of participatory decision-making is by consensus. This is the model of the doctor-patient relationship that Szasz
and Hollender refer to as the "model of mutual participation," which,
as they say, is: "Philosophically ... predicated on the postulate that
equality among human beings is desirable. It is fundamental to the
social structure of democracy, etc." 47 To the extent that it is possible, this is the kind of decision-making that is called for by the ethics
of responsibility. A responsible physician will aim for it, while a physician who, under ordinary circumstances imposes a decision unilaterally on others would eo ipso be irresponsible. Patients can, of course,
also be irresponsible, although it is difficult to be irresponsible if they
do not have any power; for, as Lukes argues, there is a close conceptual relationship between power and responsibility. 48
Ideals and Rules
Now, I do not deny that often some kind of "manipulation," either
by physician or patient, takes place and that, ,sometimes, we have to
accept unilateral decisions. The ethics of responsibility and the model
of equal participation are, however, concerned with what is ideal; as
such, they provide a rough measuring rod for distinguishing a good
physician-patient relationship from a bad one, a responsible physician
from an irresponsible one, responsible (good) from irresponsible (bad)
decision-making and, in general, responsible medical care from
irresponsible care. It should be noted that the kind of responsibility
involved here is moral responsibility, sometimes called "virtueresponsibility." 49 Responsibility in this sense should not be confused
with task, role, or official responsibility, which are simply requirements imposed on a person by his job. (Job responsibility is limited
and may be non-moral or even immoral.) In the ethics of responsibility we are concerned with moral ideals and moral virtues, i.e., what
ought to be, and not simply with rules and jobs, i.e., what is, what is
accepted and what is expected.
The conception of medical decision-making that is required by the
ethics of responsibility denies that it is always necessary to identify a
"final arbiter," which is an essential ingredient in the analysis presented by Ketchum and Pierce. Mutual, participatory decision-making
of the kind involved in this ethics entails candid and honest sharing of
information and attitudes, a frank discussion of differences, and joint
participation in the formation of, say, a treatment plan. This process
presupposes mutual respect and trust among all the parties and
requires extensive consultation, which itself is a process of mutual
education, not only patient education but also physician education.
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The position advocated here reflects the view of physicians who say
that "ultimately the success of the doctor-patient relationship is the
degree to which patient and physician are able to communicate." 50 From the ethical point of view to aim for this ideal kind
of resolution of moral-medical problems is a moral duty of everyone
of the parties concerned, including the physician, nurses and family, as
well as the patient himself.
We must remember that we are talking here about an ideal to be
aimed at; the fact that it is not always feasible or attainable does not
impugn its validity as a moral ideal. Sometimes it is more feasible than
at other times. No hard and fast rules can be drawn up as to how or
when what it requires is to be done, for circumstances and values vary
so widely. However, as a moral ideal, everyone who is involved must
constantly bear in mind the end-in-view, namely, the patient's wellbeing, which is not only a function of his purely physiological needs,
but also of his psychological, social and moral needs. What my critics
seem to have overlooked in their comments on LME is my insistence,
there and elsewhere, that a patient's welfare includes his "security,
health, education and moral integrity" and that to be responsible
means to be responsible for all of these. 51 Thus, forcing a person to
do what he firmly believes to be wrong, e.g., making a Jehovah's
Witness have a blood transfusion or making a physician perform what
he knows to be an unnecessary operation, is a violation of their moral
integrity, a concept which, I think, is much deeper, richer and more
basic than the concept of rights in the strong sense, which I claim is
derivative from it. 52 I should add that part of moral integrity requires
sharing one's concerns for oneself and for others and accepting the
responsibility for what they entail. In this way, and in many others,
we come back to the concept of responsibility, which I believe is basic
to this kind of ethics.
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